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Moon Struggles to Convince the Europeans over North Korea
President Moon Jae-In continues to struggle with Western public opinion regarding North Korea. A few weeks ago, Moon went on a European tour to drum up support for his d¤tente effort with North Korea. He visited Paris, Rome, Copenhagen, the Vatican, and Rome. He met with European leaders including British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanual Macron. The Macron visit was arguably the peak of the trip, given that the British will soon withdraw from the European Union.
The response was broadly negative. Pope Francis evinced some interest in visiting North Korea. That would, as the Moon government likely hopes, increase the global perception of North Korea‘s normalcy. It would be easier to argue for North Korea’s entrance into global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, or for foreigners to invest in North Korea if it manages a papal visit. But the pope is ultimately not relevant to the strategic issues which are at the heart of the stand-off with North Korea: no one seriously believes Pyongyang will makes concessions or otherwise discuss nuclear missiles with the pope.
The other European officials rejected Moon‘s offer to start repealing sanctions to foster d¤tente. All of them stuck, more or less, with the US, Japanese, and South Korean conservative position that North Korea has not done enough to earn a sanctions rollback. Those multilateral sanctions against North Korea are aimed squarely at the nuclear and missile programs. While North Korea has made some minor humanitarian concessions, such as family reunions, it has not moved on these strategic issues, nor on the human rights issues which make it so toxic to global opinion. The Europeans broadly accept this, leaving Moon alone in the democratic world to argue that North Korea has changed. China and Russia will say this for strategic advantage of course, but among South Korea’s democratic peers, Moon is effectively alone.
The blunt rejection of Moon‘s overture by the Europeans ¤ who are generally more moderate and less hawkish on North Korea than the US or Japan ¤ should act as a wake-up call to the government:
1. Moon’s confidence in Kim Jong-Un is not widely shared in the democratic world.
Much of the Moon government‘s argument regarding North Korea turns on Moon’s personal claim that Kim can be trusted. Critically, Moon appears to have won over US President Donald Trump to this idea. But it is also pretty apparent at this late date that Trump does not know much about Korean, nuclear weapons, or missile technology. Rather, Trump is responding to the enthusiastic flattery of Kim and Moon. Kim called Trump ‘Your Excellency’ in one of his letters, while Moon has called for Trump to win the Nobel Peace Prize. Trump adores that manner of ego-stroking and has responded positively.
But Trump is a reality TV show host unserious about the office he holds. If Moon mistook Trump‘s enthusiasm for Western acceptance of North Korean change, hopefully this European trip will disabuse him of that notion. The rest of the Western community does not believe the North has moved much at all on the strategic issues that matter most ¤ nukes and missiles. Moon has been unable to put forward much evidence. Humanitarian concessions, such as family reunions or MIA returns, are good, but small steps. Kim has still not even given over an inventory of his weapons without which serious denuclearization is impossible. Moon has fallen back on thin claims that Kim’s sincerity is demonstrated by his politeness and proper use of honorific speech (???). This is simply not enough. Moon will need to pull a lot more out of the North before Western opinion swings behind sanctions loosening.
2. Moon needs to reach out to the many stakeholders on the North Korea issue.
Many communities and stakeholders have a strong interest in how the Moon government closes any final deal with the North. The Moon government has, broadly speaking, not consulted with many of them. It has, instead, ran its d¤tente process almost entirely through a small staff in the Blue House.
Moon however is constrained. The South Korean constitution, for example, claims North Korea to be under its jurisdiction. If Moon intends to recognize the North in a more formal way, it may be necessary to change the constitution, for which Moon will need some conservative support. Instead, Moon has basically avoided the center and the right (Ahn Chul Soo and Hong Jun Pyo‘s 2017 voters) this year, leading to growing conspiracy theories on the right that Moon is some kind of communist.
Similarly Moon has not reached out to relevant constituencies and blocs in the South. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense are playing little apparent role in Northern outreach. Korea’s biggest newspapers have gone ungroomed, despite their central role in shaping public opinion. The national security community in Seoul‘s many think-tanks has similarly been playing catch-up.
Korea’s foreign partners too have generally been excluded. Japan, an obvious liberal democratic partner for the South, has been cut out for ideological reasons. The Europeans, as Moon just realized, will not simply be window-dressing. European diplomats in Seoul have told me that the government tells them little and prepared Moon‘s trip with little consultation of the relevant European diplomatic community.
Most importantly, Moon has made almost no effort to win over the Americans beyond Trump himself. The skepticism on the US side ¤ both in and out of the government ¤ is enormous, beginning with those close to Trump, such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo or National Security Advisor John Bolton, and stretching deep into the think-tank and academic world focus on North Korea.
The Moon government’s response would almost certainly be that Moon cannot spend the time grooming these many interested parties. He must push through improvements with the North in the short time window he has. Perhaps. But without buy-in from these other parties, d¤tente will not survive Moon‘s presidency. Conservatives, and others cut out now, will push back hard the next time they are in power.
The European trip’s ignominious failure ¤ the EU‘s broad rejection of Moon’s requests, Seoul‘s lack of preparation for the trip, the Blue House’ mistaken expectation that other democracies will fall in line on North Korea just because the capricious US president is on board ¤ is a pretty obvious sign that Moon should slow down and consult the many constituencies deeply vested in the North‘s fate. But I doubt this will happen.
Robert E Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University. More of his work may be found at his website,AsianSecurityBlog.wordpress.com.
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