These are exciting days on the Korean peninsula. President Moon Jae-In will shortly meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. The mood of the past few months has been upbeat. Shared sporting and cultural events have paved the way for an unanticipated rapprochement. Certainly, the movement toward talks is an improvement over last year's war threats.
President Moon deserves some credit for heading off US President Donald Trump's worst impulses. Trump is a braggart and a show-off; Moon wisely credited Trump with bringing Kim to negotiations to defuse Trump's bombast. Few people actually believed Trump was responsible for Kim's sudden move, but flattering Trump was a wise ploy by Moon.
But I find the hype around the talks surprising. There is much anticipation that some kind of break-through could occur, that a major change on the Korean peninsula is near. This is highly unlikely, and if it does occur, it will likely be at South Korea's expense. Moon should recall the following as the North Korean summit season commences this month:
1. North Korea has not embraced reform or change if Kim wants to talk, then he is doing so, because he sees some advantage to it.
There is almost no evidence that North Korea has politically changed in any meaningful way under Kim. There is no figure like Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, or Aung San Suu Kyi leading a regime opening or liberalization with a corresponding interest in rapprochement with the world. Indeed, the most remarkable part of Kim's reign is just how little North Korea has changed; the Kim family police state tyranny continues to roll along.
And it is na?ve self-congratulation to think that leftward shift of the South Korean government in the last year has motivated this. When Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-Wha suggested that the North Koreans were serious about denuclearization, because Kim Jong-Un told her so, analysts blanched in disbelief.
So if North Korea is still the same North Korea we have always known, then the sudden flurry of summitry with Moon, Trump, Abe, Xi, Putin, and so on suggests that Pyongyang sees an advantage to it. By far the simplestexplanation is that Kim now has the nuclear weapons to strike the United States, thereby guaranteeing his safety. From this position of strength, he can offer talks to anyone and everyone he even met the head of the International Olympic Committee in order to see what he can get for his newfound capabilities. Essentially, he is going shopping, to cash out the gains of his nuclear drive.
2. A departure of US Forces Korea (USFK) is almost certainly irreversible.
The most obvious 'grand bargain' deal with North Korea would be its full denuclearization in exchange for USFK's exit. South Korea should be very cautious about accepting this. It may seem an initially attractive way to tamp down tension, and Moon would likely spin it as nationalistically as possible liberation from the US and so on.
But South Koreans should know that once the US leaves, it is unlikely to ever return, and there are a lot of subtle costs to that. The US provides a world-class security guarantee to South Korea which few other countries enjoy and which keeps South Korea's defense budget substantially lower than it would otherwise be. The US tie also bolsters South Korea generally as a middle power surround by great powers with whom its relations have often been rocky. And the US tie has more tightly connected South Korea to a wider world dominated by US soft power, including US universities, the dollar, English, and Wall Street access.
US retrenchment would notignite a crisis. But South Koreans should know that it is the South Korean side which has generally been uncomfortable with the reversion of OPCON (operational control) to South Korea for fear of poor readiness. And the US has not often returned to places it leaves, such as the Philippines. The pressure on the US budget of spiraling deficits means that if we leave, we won't come back. Be sure you really want that.
3. The last few efforts at summitry and the Sunshine Policy had distinctly meager results for the South.
The most obvious analogy for the Moon-Kim summit is previous inter-Korean summits between Presidents Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun, and Kim Jong-Il. These did not go particularly well. By now, it is well-known that the first inter-Korean summit required a direct personal, mafia-style payoff of US dollars to Kim to insure his attendance.
The summits were couched in the larger Sunshine Policy effort, which also did not really work out well. South Korea made concessions totaling between three and four billion US dollars, but it is not really clear what South Korea got in return. To sure, North Korea's provocations diminished. But that agreeing not to attack South Korea so long as the money flowed - is hardly a concession. It is more like blackmail by a gangster. The Kaesong industrial complex did not serve its intended purpose either: small-scale entrepreneurial capitalist ventures were not sparked by the site. Instead Pyongyang walled it off as an enclave economy from which it extracted billions in legal US dollars without any obvious gain to the South. In the end, we know that both Presidents Kim and Roh were disappointed with how little North Korea actually reciprocated Southern concessions. Pyongyangeven continued the nuclear program during the Sunshine period.
All this lead to crushing criticism in the conservative press and fueled Lee Myung-Bak's victory in 2007. If Moon is going to avoid the same fate, then he has to get real concessions from the North. Pyongyang must give up something genuinely meaningful, such as human rights improvements or nuclear inspectors. North Korea's traditional concessions more talks, inter-Korean projects, family reunions are not concessions at all, as they are not costly to the North.
So we wish Moon well. Perhaps he can find the deal with North Korea which has eluded so many of his predecessors. But there is little to suggest this is likely. North Korea is still the same horrific orwellian tyranny it has always been, and it pretty clearly gamed the last round of Sunshine toits advantage. And now it has nuclear weapons too.
On top of all that is Donald Trump, who clearly cares not at all for South Korean (or Japanese) interests in these upcoming summits. If it is in Trump's interest to gamble away USFK to insure a public relations 'win,' so that he can shake off all his scandals or avoid impeachment back home, he will. Trump knows little about Korea and has no inclination to learn.
So Moon is a very tough spot. He will have to be a tough negotiator to navigate these shoals. The wisest course is to go slow avoid any grand bargain that Kim (or Trump) will be sorely tempted to gimmick.
Robert E Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University. More of his work may be found at his website,AsianSecurityBlog.wordpress.com.
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