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After Hanoi, Moon Needs to Build Greater Consensus for Outreach to North Korea
Many lessons will be drawn from the collapse of the Hanoi summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean supreme leader Kim Jeong Un. Hawks will claim North Korea sought far too much for the closure of Yongbyon. Doves will claim the inverse. Trump‘s many critics will claim that he is too impulsive and poorly informed for his made-for-TV summits to work.

All of these critiques are perhaps correct. North Korea did indeed offer too little, while the US also demanded for more than was realistic (complete denuclearization for sanctions). And Trump’s insistence on launching these summits with only one month to prepare ¤ as was the case for before both the Singapore and Hanoi summits ¤ almost certainly makes a deal that much harder. It would have been astonishing if a grand bargain had been worked out in just one month.

But I think the larger lesson is that Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-In need to build far more consensus among the many relevant stakeholders on North Korea about what progress means and what a good deal with the North would be. Trump was emphatic at Hanoi that ‘no deal was better than a bad deal,’ but there is little consensus on the terms of good, or at least acceptable, deal among the many parties in South Korea and the US (and Japan) with deep interests in North Korea.

This confusion has reflected itself in the results. After five summits with Kim Jong Un in a year ¤ three by the South Korean president, and two by the US president ¤ disappointingly little has been achieved. The rhetoric from all sides has been heroic, but the empirical change is been small (mostly minor deployment changes along the military demarcation line).

There has been much talk since Hanoi that Moon needs to resuscitate the flagging process. And so he does. The best way to do that is start laying out terms he will accept from North Korea and then soliciting other stakeholders for their views on those terms, in order to build some manner of consensus to present to Kim Jong Un.

Moon must do this, because Trump, quite honestly, is incapable of it. He is too ignorant of Korea, nuclear weapons, and missile technology, and too lazy to learn. He also loathes his political opponents at home and places personal relationships above coalition-building and bureaucratic maneuver. Trump will not reach out, develop proposals, solicit input from relevant parties, craft a negotiating strategy, and so on. He will instead seek quick, grand bargain deals with Kim as he did at Singapore and Hanoi, or he will simply dump the issue on others ¤ likely US Secretary of State Pompeo or Moon. Trump has been unable to respond to the bureaucratic resistance his North Korean initiatives have provoked, because he is too disinterested and slothful to organize a major, sustained presidential campaign to move public opinion and push change on wary and resistant groups.

Moon therefore must lead. Of all the relevant players ¤ Moon, Trump, Kim, plus Japan and China in the background ¤ Moon is the most committed. He has staked his presidency on d¤tente with North Korea, and he has been thinking about this moment for decades.

Unfortunately however, the South Korean president has acted much as Trump has ¤ running his North Korea efforts through a tight coterie of staff and colleagues at the top of the executive branch with little input from the outside. Many interested parties in South Korea have not been fully consulted ¤ most obviously the National Assembly and the conservative Liberty Korea Party. I spoke at a National Assembly Research Service conference last year where the primary concern of the gathered Assemblymen was not this or that deal with the North, but rather basic information. The Blue House was simply not telling them much about its engagement with Pyongyang.

South Korea‘s conservatives are reacting even more sharply, as they are almost entirely cut out of this process. There is much unhinged talk on the South Korean right now, even in respectable quarters, about Moon as a North Korean spy or seeking the overthrow of South Korean democracy. I have received hundreds of emails in a conservative letter writing campaign asserting that Moon will end the US alliance and turn South Korea over to Pyongyang. This is obviously paranoid conspiracy theorizing, but the hysteria on the right does indicate how little Moon has solicited or listened to conservative concerns.

The Blue House may be inclined to ignore these parties and push on, but no deal with the North will survive without some legislative and conservative support. Because South Korea is a democracy, Moon will need some manner of approval from the legislature for his revolution in Korean affairs. And without some conservative input and assent, the right will overturn Moon’s initiatives as soon as it retakes power, much as it rolled back the Sunshine Policy on reclaiming the presidency in 2008.

Abroad, Moon might also reach out to Japan for its buy-in. This is all but impossible now given the state of relations. However, a hostile Japan could play spoiler, as it has in past, for example, by flirting with unilateral recognition, and the abductee issue will continue. No Japanese financial assistance for a Korean settlement will be forthcoming without some movement on the kidnappings and if Japan is cut out of the process.

Moon might also reach out to Western players beyond his singular, flattering focus on Trump. Moon‘s trip to Europe late last year failed regarding sanctions lifting, because the Blue House did not bother to consult the European diplomatic community in South Korea. The president simply flew to Europe and expected results. Moon similarly might reach out to US players in Congress, and the think-tank and analyst community. These stakeholders are deeply suspicious of Trump’s rushed, erratic diplomacy and strongly value the US-South Korea alliance. They worry that Moon is making concessions to the North for little in return.

The South Korean president‘s reputation is built on promoting democracy and openness against South Korea’s earlier dictatorship. This is a noble legacy. It is therefore incongruous that Moon should run the most important initiative of his career with so little public consultation and outreach. This is both undemocratic and unwise.