[????/??? ??]??? ‘? ? ??’? ????

南北, 北美 ??? ???? ??? ???·????? ? ?? ?? 北
?? ICBM ??? ????? ??
???? ??? ?? ?? ???? ??? ??? ??? ?? ????
??? ??·??·??? ?? ???

??? ??, ??, ??? ????? ?? ???? ??? ???. ????? ????? ?????, ????? ????? ?? ? ?? ?(準(zhǔn))????? ?????? ???? ??. ??? ?? ??? ?? ???? ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???. ???? ??? ?? ??????? ??? ?? ?? ??? ??? ???. ?? ??? ??? ????, ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ???? ??? ? ? ?? ????? ???.

??? ??? ??? ????? ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ???? ??. ??? ??? ?? ??? ???. ??? ???? ????? ???? ??? ???? ??. ????? ?? ??? ???? ????? ??? ?? ?????. ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ???? ???. ??? ????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ?? ??? ????? ??. ??? ??? ?? ??? ??? ???? ??.

????? ?? ???? ????. ??? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ??? ? ?? ?? ??? ??? ??? ???? ?? ???? ??? ??? ???. ?? ??? ??? ??? ????? ?? ????? ???, ???? ?? ??? ????, ???? ?????, ???? ???? ? ? ?? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ???. ?? ??? ?? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ??? ???? ???. ??? ??? ??? ??? ???? ???? ?? ? ??? ???.

?? ??? ??? ?? ???? ?? ??. ??? ??? ????? ??? ??? ???? ??. ?? ???, ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?????? ? ?? ???? ??? ??? ???? ??. ???? ?? ????? CVID, ? ???? ?? ???? ????? ???? ???? ? ?? ?? ???? ??? ???. ?? ????? CVID? ???? ???? ?? ??? ??? ??? ?? ? ????? ??? ????? ?? ?? ???? ????? ??? ??? ??? ???.

??? ??? ?? ????. ??? ??? ??? ?? ???? ? ? 1? ?? ??? ??? ???. ??????? ??? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ??? ? ??? ??? ? ???. ??? ??? ??? ????? ??? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ????.

???? ?? ??? ???? ??? ??? ???? ?? ??? ????. ????? ?? ?? ???? ?? ???? ?? ? ?????? ??? ?? ??? ??. ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? ??????? ???? ? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ??.

?? ?? ??? ?? ???? ?? ?? ??? ???? ?? ????? ??? ??? ?? ??? ?? ????? ??. ??? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?? ??? ???, ????? ??? ? ??? ??? ???.

??? ???? ??? ‘???’ ??? ??? ????. ??? ????? ???? ????? ?? ??? ??? ???? ??. ???????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ???? ?? ? ?? ???? ?? ??? ?? ??. ? ?? ?? ?? ???? ??? ??? ????? ???? ??? ?? ?? ?? ??? ????? ??? ???? ?? ???.

??? ? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??? ???. ??? ???? ??? ?? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ?? ???? ?? ??? ??? ??? ??? ????.

??? ?? ?????? ??? ?? ?? ??? ???? ????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ???? ?? ??. ?? ? ??? ????????? ?? ??? ??? ??? ?? ????? ?? ????. ?? ????? ???? ? ??? ??? ?? ??? ??? ?? ?? ??? ???? ????. ?? ??? ?? ?? ? ??? ??? ??? ???? ??. ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ???, ??? ??? ?? ??? ???? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ???? ???.

??? ??? ???? ??? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ??? ?? ????. ??? ????? ???, ????? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??? ?? ??? ??? ?? ????. ???, ???, ????, ?? ? ??? ???? ???? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ??? ????. ??? ??? ???? ???? 2018?? ??? ?? ??? ??? ??? ?? ?? ??? TV?? ???? ? ???. ?? ??? ??? ???? ?? ?? ????? ?? ??? ???? ? ??? ???? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ? ???. ? ?? ????, ?? ???, ??? ?? ???? ??? ???. ??? ??? ??? ???? ??? ???? ??.

??? ?? ??????·??? ???? ??
▼?? ??▼

“Still Waiting for Meaningful North Korean Concessions”
The rumor this summer is that the two Koreas, China, and the United States are now negotiating a statement to end the Korean War. It is not clear if this is a peace treaty, a peace regime, or some other semi-legal mechanism. If it is not a peace treaty, it is not clear if this will be enough to formally end hostilities. But whatever its final character, yet another meeting or statement of intent does not change the political balance of forces on the peninsula. North Korea has still not meaningfully signaled any political or strategic changes. It has not yet indicated a willingness to make a major concession to reassure skeptics that this year‘s engagement is the real deal rather than another bad faith effort to gain concessions for cosmetic changes.

There are two broad sets of concessions we are looking for from North Korea: political and strategic.

By political we mean issues about the character of the regime itself. North Korea is not just another dictatorship, like Vladimir Putin’s Russia or Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a uniquely totalitarian system in the world. Its human rights record is the worst on the planet, and its personality cult is the most servile in history. Ideally we would like to see this change. We would like to see North Korea be less dangerous both to its own people and to the rest of the world. We would be willing to bargain for such changes.

Much of this concern is captured in the flagship issue of human rights in North Korea. One obvious and big concession North Korea could make to prove its goodwill, and dramatically win over skeptics, would be to ease off the oppression and brutalization of its own people. There are also other political concessions we would be willing to trade for - meaningful commercial law to formalize the rise of gray market capitalism in the North, the right to travel abroad, judicial independence, multi-party elections, and so on. To be sure, these are highly unlikely, but they mirror Mikhail Gorbachev‘s glasnost policy in the Soviet Union. The best way to put d?tente on firm ground would for North Korea to be less political distinct from South Korea. South Korea will not become more dictatorial obviously. Genuine reconciliation will mean some manner of liberalization in the North.

Because these political changes are highly improbable, much of the current discussion focuses on more limited, less dramatic strategic concessions in the military balance. Specifically, there are three areas where we are looking for concessions: nuclear weapons, missiles, and North Korean military deployments along the inter-Korean border, especially near Seoul. The debate over nuclear weapons and missiles is by now well-known. This is what US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had in mind when insisting on CVID - the complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament of North Korea. Many analysts believe CVID is unlikely, but we could, perhaps, negotiate North Korea into capping its program at what it already has, and permitting inspectors.

But we also worry about North Korean conventional military power. Approximately 70% of the North Korean People’s Army is concentrated within 75 kilometers of the demilitarized zone. Near Seoul, the KPA has concentrated approximately 10,000 artillery and rocket launchers. A KPA retrenchment from the military demarcation line would be a major concession for which we should also be willing to bargain. And indeed, the Moon government has already proposed a mutual pullback, including artillery.

Unfortunately, none of these sorts of serious concessions - political or strategic - have yet been floated by North Korea. To date, its actions have humanitarian concessions - such as the return of US soldiers‘ remains or inter-Korean family reunions - and minor military concessions such as the dismantlements of Sohae and Punggyre-ri. Importantly, these are not really costly moves by the North.

The return of remains and family reunions are morally important to the US and South Korea, but not genuinely costly to the North. This is an important distinction. While we wish for these things for humanitarian reasons, these are not difficult actions for the North and do not impact the serious political and strategic issues we care about. Indeed, Pyongyang is often accused of muddying the waters by raising these sorts of issues which strike an emotional cord in South Korea and the US but ultimately serve to change the subject.

Similarly, North Korea’s ‘military’ concessions have so far been thin. Punggyre-ri may already have been a compromised site due to multiple previous nuclear tests weakening the mountain. Sohae may no longer be needed given previous advances in North Korean rocketry. Neither is irreversible, and no outside inspectors have seen the dismantlements up close. So it is hard to know just how valuable these moves are.

None of this analysis is particularly controversial. No one expected North Korea to make dramatic unilateral moves to disarm - except perhaps for US President Donald Trump who does not understand these issues and seems mostly interested in the political credit. We will of course have to bargain with North Korea. They will ask for something - a lot, in fact - for these sorts of concessions. And we should be having a major public debate about just what we should be willing to give away to get major movement from the North on critical issues such as nuclear weapons or human rights.

But critically and disappointingly, the North has not yet even evinced a willingness to seriously discuss these issues. Just this week, it was caught by US spy agencies building yet more intercontinental ballistic missiles. There has been much pageantry and grandiose rhetoric about this year‘s d?tente, especially from the Moon government. And certainly we all hope for a break-through. But it is important to note just how little North Korea has actually given up, indeed, just how little it has even suggested it might concede.

The Panmunjom and Singapore Declarations repeat what we have heard many times before from Pyongyang. No political or strategic concessions were given up those statements, nor has Pyongyang floated any since the meetings. We are all still waiting for North Korea to speak to what we really want - nukes, missiles, military deployments, and human rights. Without this, 2018’s d?tente is still mostly just great TV, but not genuine progress. And if we give North Korea the peace treaty for no concessions, then it will be yet another missed opportunity, after the Declarations, to push the North on the issues we care about. No amount of statements, legal language, meetings, and so on will cover that up. We are still waiting for North Korea to take this seriously.
Robert E Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University. More of his work may be found at his website,AsianSecurityBlog.wordpress.com.